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ACH year, the courts provide practitioners in the school law fieldEwith new cases to evaluate and apply to their practice. Each ses-
sion of the state and federal legislatures adds excitement to the
practice, making changes that sometimes result in a completely new area
of focus for school lawyers and public school districts. This article sum-
marizes relevant cases and legislative action from October 2001 through
October 2002. Due to the volume of information that exists, this article
focuses on the cases and legislative action that have greater impact on the
public schools of Texas. The cases are grouped according to subject and
issues. A brief synopsis of the federal No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act
is also included.'
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1. Due to the voluminous nature of the NCLB, the summary provided in this article
is just that, a summary. An entire article can be dedicated to this legislative effort alone.




Because student issues routinely make the headlines across the nation
and constantly change school law, it is fitting to begin this discussion with
student issues. The phrase "students do not shed their constitutional
rights ... at the schoolhouse gate" has long been cited in favor of stu-
dents.2 However, as detailed below, the pendulum appears to be swing-
ing back toward providing public school districts with increasing rights.
1. FERPA: What Constitutes an Education Record?
The Family Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) has long been
a subject of debate in the public schools. In particular, the debate has
focused on the scope of FERPA protection for student identifiable infor-
mation. Prior to a recent Supreme Court decision, school districts, in an
abundance of caution, applied FERPA to any information or document
that identified a student in any manner. On February 19, 2002, the Su-
preme Court clarified this issue with its holding in Owasso Independent
School District v. Falvo.3 The Court reversed the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals decision and held that a school district does not violate FERPA
by allowing students to engage in peer grading.4 In this case, peer grad-
ing involved students exchanging papers with each other, scoring them
according to the teacher's instructions, returning the work to the student
who prepared it, and then either reading the score aloud to the teacher or
walking to the teacher's desk and revealing it in confidence.5
A mother with three children attending school in Owasso Independent
School District (OISD) in a suburb of Tulsa, Oklahoma, claimed the peer
grading process embarrassed her children. She requested the district
adopt a uniform policy banning peer grading and requiring teachers to
grade assignments themselves or at least to forbid students from grading
papers other than their own. 6 OISD refused to ban the peer grading
practice and the mother brought a § 1983 claim against the district and
individual school officials, alleging that the peer grading process violated
FERPA.7
The specific FERPA condition at issue in this case was the requirement
that school districts refrain from implementing any policies or practices
permitting the release of a student's education records without the writ-
ten consent of a parent.8 To determine whether OISD was violating
FERPA through its peer grading practice, the Court considered whether
Department of Education No Child Left Behind website http://www.nclb.gov, or the Texas
Education Agency website at http://www.tea.state.tx.us.
2. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
3. Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426 (2002).
4. Id. at 436.
5. Id. at 429.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 428.
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the grades revealed in the process constituted education records. 9
The Court issued a narrow holding stating that a student assignment
does not become an "education record" when it is graded by another
student.10 Therefore, the court found FERPA was not violated by the
district's practice of allowing students call out their grade.1'
In reaching its decision, the Court emphasized that FERPA defines
"education records" as "records, files, documents, and other materials"
containing information directly related to a student, which "are main-
tained by an educational agency or institution or by a person acting for
such agency or institution.' 1 2 The Court believed FERPA implies that
education records are institutional records kept by a single central custo-
dian, such as a registrar, not individual assignments handled by many stu-
dent graders in their separate classrooms. 13 The Supreme Court accepted
the ordinary meaning of the word "maintained" as "to keep in existence
or continuance; preserve; retain.' 4 Accordingly, the Court reasoned that
student assignments graded by other students are not education records
because they are not "maintained" by an educational agency or institu-
tion. Furthermore, the Court stated that, even if they agreed that a stu-
dent's act of grading another student's paper is an example of a student
acting for the teacher, this action did not rise to a sufficient level to indi-
cate that the student was acting for the educational agency or institution,
as described by the statute.t 5
The holding in this case provides school districts with guidance as to
how courts will interpret alleged violations of FERPA in the future. The
Court listed several benefits of peer grading: teaching material again in a
new context to reinforce the lesson; helping students learn how to assist
and respect fellow students; and discovering whether the students under-
stand the material. 16
The Court indicated that classifying peer grading as a FERPA violation
would allow federal power to exercise minute control over specific teach-
ing methods. 17 Further, requiring school districts to ban this practice
would impose substantial burdens on teachers across the country, forcing
them to take time, which otherwise could be spent teaching or preparing
lessons, to correct an assortment of daily student assignments. 18 The Su-
preme Court did not believe that Congress intended to intervene with
this traditional state function and was unwilling to interpret the statute in
9. Id. at 431.
10. Id. at 436.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 426 (citing section 1232g(a)(4)(A)).
13. Id. at 940.
14. Id. at 433 (citing RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1160
(2d ed. 1987)).
15. Id. at 433.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 435.
18. Id. at 435-36.
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a way that would require peer grading practices to be banned.19
2. Student Searches
The Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures, has long been applied to the search of a student by a school
official. 20 For a student search to be permissible under the Fourth
Amendment, it must first have been justified at its inception and second,
have been reasonably related in scope to the objectives of the search.
According to the Supreme Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O., a student
search must not be "excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the
student and the nature of the infraction.121 Until recently, however, it
was unclear whether the T.L.O. standard for student searches by school
officials also applied to student searches conducted by law enforcement
officials, including school resource officers.2 2 In Russell v. State, the Waco
Court of Appeals clarified this issue. Specifically, the court held that the
"twofold inquiry" adopted in T.L.O. for searches conducted by school
officials also applies to searches conducted by school police officers or
liaison officers acting on their own authority.23
In Russell, a parking lot attendant observed three students smoking in
a car. The attendant sent the students to the principal's office. Russell,
one of the students, wore baggy cargo shorts, which had been banned at
other school campuses because of the ease with which weapons could be
hidden in the shorts. Fearing that Russell might be concealing a weapon,
the principal ordered Russell to empty his pockets and he refused. The
principal then asked a police officer who was assigned to the high school
to join the investigation. 24 When the officer entered the principal's office,
the principal told the officer that she had seen Russell "messing with his
pockets" and that he refused to empty them. The officer testified that the
shorts were so "big and bulky" that he would not have been able to see a
hidden weapon. The officer further testified that his past experience with
students who refused to empty their pockets for a school administrator
usually indicated the concealment of a weapon, marijuana, or cigarettes.
The officer then conducted a pat-down search to determine whether Rus-
sell, in fact, had a weapon in his pocket. Instead of discovering a weapon,
however, the officer discovered a small baggie containing marijuana. 25
Russell was charged with a misdemeanor offense of possession of less
than two ounces of marijuana in a drug-free zone. At a pre-trial suppres-
sion hearing, Russell argued that the search violated his Fourth Amend-
ment rights, but the trial court denied the motion. He then pled nolo
19. Id. at 436.
20. Russell v. State, 74 S.W.3d 887, 891 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, pet. denied) (citing
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)).
21. Id. (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42).
22. Id. at 891.
23. Id.




contendere and appealed, arguing that the court abused its discretion by
denying his motion to suppress.2 6
Based on the facts, the court concluded that the officer had reasonable
grounds for suspecting that the search would reveal evidence that Russell
was concealing a weapon in his pocket, thus satisfying the "justified at its
inception" prong of the T.L.O. test.27 Furthermore, the court viewed the
search of Russell's pocket after the initial pat down as being reasonably
related to the objectives of the search and, therefore, not excessively in-
trusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the
infraction, thus satisfying the second prong of the test.2 8 Under the
T.L. 0. standard, the court upheld the search of the student by the officer.
This decision provides guidance for future situations in which a school
administrator may choose to involve a school resource officer or other
law enforcement officer in student searches.
3. Student Discipline
Parents regularly appeal student assignments to alternative education
programs (AEP's). Generally, the dispute in these appeals is whether a
student's assignment to AEP's violates the student's constitutionally pro-
tected property or liberty rights. In Stafford Municipal School District v.
L.P. & Y.P., 2 9 the court evaluated a student's right to appeal the assign-
ment to an AEP to determine whether the student possessed a constitu-
tionally protected property or liberty right. L.P. and Y.P. were parents of
a public school student who was transferred to the district's AEP for dis-
ciplinary reasons when the student was arrested and charged with crimi-
nal mischief for "keying" two cars in the school parking lot.30
The parents filed suit against the district alleging that the district's fail-
ure to inform them of their right to appeal the transfer violated the stu-
dent's due process rights.31 Specifically, the parents asserted that the
district denied their son his property and liberty interest in public educa-
tion by his placement in AEP. The school district filed a plea to the juris-
diction claiming that the parents failed to state a cause of action within
the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. The district argued that pro-
cedural due process applies only to the deprivation of interests protected
by the Texas Constitution, and not to the right to appeal a disciplinary
transfer to an AEP.32
The Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held that the transfer to the
AEP did not involve a property or liberty interest.33 The court empha-
26. Id. at 890.
27. Id. at 892-93.
28. Id. at 893.
29. Stafford Mun. Sch. Dist. v. L.P., 64 S.W.3d 559 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2001, no pet.).
30. Id. at 561.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 564.
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sized the court's decision in Nevares v. San Marcos Consol. Indep. Sch.
Dist., which held that a student was not denied access to public education
when placed in an AEP.34 Rather, the court in Nevares found students
were merely temporarily transferred from one school program to another
program for stricter discipline. Additionally, the Stafford court deter-
mined that the student had no liberty interest in his reputation. Accord-
ingly, the court held that the district's failure to inform the parents and
student of their right to appeal did not violate the student's due process
rights.35 Thus, the case was reversed and remanded to the trial court for
a ruling on the district's plea to the jurisdiction consistent with the court's
holding.
4. Student Drug Testing
Many school administrators eagerly awaited a recent Supreme Court
decision concerning the right of public school districts to require student
drug testing. In Board of Education of Independent School District No
92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, the Court clarified this issue. 36 In
Earls, high school students challenged the constitutionality of the school's
suspicionless urinalysis drug testing policy. The district court for the
Western District of Oklahoma upheld the school's policy, and the stu-
dents appealed. 37 The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court, holding
that the school district's drug testing policy violated the Fourth Amend-
ment by requiring all students participating in competitive extracurricular
activities to submit to drug testing.38 The Supreme Court reversed the
Tenth Circuit, holding that the school district's interest in preventing, de-
terring, and detecting drug use was sufficient to outweigh a student's
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure.39
In support of its decision, the Court found the Fourth Amendment is
implicated in drug testing cases because the collection of urine samples
for use in drug testing is considered a "search" by public school offi-
cials.4 0 Typically, in the criminal context, the Fourth Amendment re-
quires a showing of probable cause.41 However, according to the Court,
and as seen in Russell and T.L.O., the probable cause standard is not
suited to determining the reasonableness of a search by school officials
where the school seeks to "prevent the development of a hazardous con-
dition.'' 42 Moreover, as previously held in Vernonia Independent School
34. Id. at 563 (citing Nevares v. San Marcos Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 111 F.3d 25, 26-
27 (5th Cir. 1997)).
35. Id. at 561.
36. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 122 S. Ct. 2559 (2002).
37. Id. at 2563.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2564, 2568.
40. Id. at 2564.
41. Id.




District v. Acton,43 the school district's interest in protecting its students
outweighs the student's Fourth Amendment interest where the school
district's policy is implemented in response to an immediate and legiti-
mate concern that students are using drugs.44 In reaching its decision in
Vernonia, the Court balanced the intrusion on a student's Fourth Amend-
ment right not to be subjected to unreasonable searches and seizures
against a school district's legitimate interest in conducting drug testing.45
According to the Court, one factor which tipped the scale of the balanc-
ing test in the school district's favor was that school officials knew that
student athletes were using drugs and acting as leaders of the drug
culture. 46
In reversing the district court, the Court found the Tenth Circuit had
mistakenly construed Vernonia to conclude that, in order for a school dis-
trict's drug testing policy to be upheld, a school district must demonstrate
that the policy was implemented to remedy an existing drug problem
among the students who are the subject of the policy. 47 Both Vernonia
and Earls make it clear, however, that a district does not have to show
that a drug problem exists to justify the implementation of a drug testing
policy.48 A district need only demonstrate that a drug testing policy pro-
motes a legitimate governmental interest that outweighs the intrusion on
a student's Fourth Amendment right to privacy. 49
In reaching its conclusion, the Court considered the nature of the
Fourth Amendment "privacy" interest allegedly compromised by the
school's drug testing policy. As with the Court's decision in T.L.O., the
Court in Earls held that the reasonableness of a search is determined by
balancing the nature of the intrusion on the individual's privacy against
the promotion of legitimate governmental interests. 50 According to the
Court, because the state is responsible for maintaining discipline, health,
and safety in public schools, a student in a public school environment has
a limited right to privacy.51 Furthermore, as in Vernonia, student athletes
have less expectation of privacy because they share open bathroom space
in locker rooms.52 According to the Vernonia Court, the intrusion im-
posed by requesting a student to produce a urine sample behind a closed
stall was negligible, at best.53 In addition, students choose to join a club
or sport, voluntarily subjecting themselves to a degree of regulation
higher than that imposed on students in general.54 On this basis, the
43. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
44. Id. at 648-49.
45. Id. at 652-53.
46. Id. at 649.
47. Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2563.
48. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653; Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2564-65.
49. Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2564-65.
50. Id.
51. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655-56; Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2565.
52. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657.
53. Id. at 658.
54. Id. at 657.
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Court determined that the "policy requiring all students who participated
in extracurricular activities to submit to drug testing was a reasonable
means of furthering the school district's important interest in preventing
and deterring drug use among its schoolchildren, and therefore, did not
violate the Fourth Amendment. '55
Regardless of the decisions in Vernonia and Earls, most school lawyers
recommend that school districts should exercise caution when developing
drug testing policies. The Earls students argued that there was no real
immediate, legitimate concern that non-athletes were using drugs.56
While the Court clarified that a demonstration of a drug abuse problem
among the students being tested is not necessary to validate a drug testing
policy, the Court also implied that evidence of a drug problem will
strengthen an argument in favor of a drug testing policy. 57 Additionally,
important to the Court's decision in Earls was the Court's finding that the
students affected by the policy had a limited expectation of privacy, the
degree of intrusion was negligible given the method of collection of urine
samples, and the only consequence of a failed test was to limit the stu-
dents' privilege of participating in the extracurricular activity. These two
points raised by the Court imply that school districts might want to: (1)
continue to gather evidence of a drug problem in support of a drug test-
ing policy; and (2) evaluate the method of collection to ensure that the
degree of intrusion is as limited as possible.
Following this decision, on September 6, 2002, the Fifth Circuit recon-
sidered whether Tulia Independent School District's drug testing policy
violated a student's Fourth Amendment rights in light of Earls and
Vernonia.58 The court vacated the decision.
5. Sexual Harassment
Sexual harassment, specifically student-on-student harassment, contin-
ues to be an issue faced in the public schools. In Doe v. Dallas Indepen-
dent School District,59 the mother of a five-year-old girl attending school
in the Dallas Independent School District (DISD) brought a suit against
the district alleging that DISD administrators acted with deliberate indif-
ference to a sexual assault complaint involving her daughter. The mother
alleged that the school district was familiar with John Doe's history of
grabbing and fondling female classmates in an inappropriate manner, but
the district took no steps to prevent him from repeating this type of be-
havior with her daughter.60 The complaint alleged that John Doe as-
55. Earls, 122 S. Ct. at 2559.
56. Id. at 2567.
57. Id. at 2567-68.
58. Gardner v. Tulia Indep. Sch. Dist., 183 F. Supp. 2d 854 (N.D. Tex. 2000), vacated by
2002 WL 31049486 (5th Cir. Sept. 6, 2002) (Table).
59. Doe v. Dallas indep. Sch. Dist., No. CIV.A.3:01-CV-1092-R (N.D. Tex. July 16,
2002) (unpublished opinion), 2002 WL 1592694.
60. Id. at *1.
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saulted Jane Doe II in P.E. class by using his hand to violate her vagina.61
The school counselor and the school nurse confirmed physical evidence
existed that supported Jane Doe II's claims.62 The district separated the
students and restricted the victim from attending P.E.63 The school prin-
cipal allegedly gave inadequate attention to the problem, failed to take
any significant steps to remedy the situation, and accused Jane Doe II of
fabricating the entire incident.64 John Doe assaulted Jane Doe II a sec-
ond time. 65 Again, the mother alleged the administration acted with de-
liberate indifference when they told Jane Doe II to forget the incident
and took no further remedial action.66
The mother filed suit alleging the DISD was deliberately indifferent to
the complaints of sexual assault in violation of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681.
Further, the mother alleged the DISD violated her daughter's due pro-
cess rights by establishing customs and/or policies in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1983.67 The district court held that a cause of action existed as
to the mother's Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 claim, but did not find that a
cause of action existed as to the mother's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.68 The
district court found the school district had not affirmatively placed Jane
Doe II in danger and, therefore, the student's injuries were not caused by
a school policy of the district. The court dismissed her § 1983 claim.69
However, the court did find that the mother's complaint satisfied the
requirements for relief under Title IX.70 Specifically, the court found the
principal's response to Jane Doe II's complaint qualified as deliberate in-
difference and the administration had actual knowledge of physical symp-
toms of the abuse. Further, the court determined the manual penetration
of the student's vagina qualified as "sufficiently severe one-on-one peer
harassment" to establish a claim under Title IX. Finally, the court found
that removing the student from P.E. may have deprived her of access to
the educational activities or benefits provided by the school.71
6. Student Discipline
A claim of "disparate discipline" is frequently invoked in situations in-
volving student athletes and students participating in extracurricular ac-
tivities. In Perkins v. Alamo Heights Independent School District, the
parents of a female student brought an action against the Alamo Heights
ISD (AHISD) and its superintendent, alleging that the students were
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at *5.




68. Id. at *9.
69. Id. at *3.
70. Id. at *9.
71. Id. at *5-6.
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"disparately disciplined" based on their gender.72 The incident at issue
involved members of the varsity cheerleading squad who attended a party
where hazing and alcohol consumption allegedly occurred. 73 Based on
the allegations, the students accused of participating in the incident were
told they would be ineligible to try out for any future "spirit positions. '74
However, the male student athletes who attended the party were not per-
manently removed from their extracurricular activities. The parents al-
leged that the school's actions: (1) had resulted in irreparable injury to
the students "because they have been stripped of student honors and par-
ticipation in their extracurricular activities;" (2) will have an irreparable
adverse and negative effect on the students with regard to scholarships;
and (3) negatively affected the students' good names (in which the par-
ents asserted the students had a liberty interest). 75 Additionally, the par-
ents claimed the school's actions violated: Article 7, Section 1 of the
Texas Constitution because the school's actions were not consistent with
an efficient educational system, the Texas Equal Rights Amendment, and
the due process of law provision of the Texas Constitution. 76
The parents filed a suit on their claims and a request for a temporary
restraining order in district court.77 The school district subsequently filed
Notice of Removal in the United States District Court, Western District
of Texas, on the basis that the parents' claims involved claims arising
under federal law. The court held that removal was proper and a prelimi-
nary injunction was not warranted under the facts presented.78
In reaching its decision to deny the request for a preliminary injunc-
tion, the court scrutinized the evidence presented by the parents in sup-
port of their claims.79 The court found no evidence of disparate
treatment on the basis of gender, rather finding that the "involved educa-
tors and school board members agonized over their decision and afforded
the students adequate due process." 80 Although the court noted that it
might make a different decision, it upheld the prevailing interpretation of
the courts that the personal decision of the court defers to the decision of
the local school board. 81 Specifically, "the law does not provide for the
courts to become super school boards except upon a strong showing of a
violation of federal law or constitutional standards." 82
72. Perkins v. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist., 204 F. Supp. 2d 991 (W.D. Tex. 2002).




77. Id. at 993.




82. Id. (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Anderson v. Canton Mun.
Separate Sch. Dist., 232 F.3d 450, 455-56 (5th Cir. 2000)).
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7. FERPA: Does It Provide a Private Cause of Action?
In Gonzaga University v. Doe,83 John Doe brought a § 1983 action
against the university and a university employee, claiming a violation of
FERPA. Doe was a former undergraduate and graduate student in the
School of Education at Gonzaga University.84 It was his intention to
teach at a Washington public elementary school. 85 One of Gonzaga's
"Teacher Certification Specialists" overheard one student tell another
student that Doe had engaged in acts of sexual misconduct against a fe-
male undergraduate student. 86 The university employee launched an in-
vestigation and contacted the state agency responsible for teacher
certification, identifying Doe by name and discussing the allegations
against him.87 John Doe was never informed of the investigation, never
informed of any discussion with the state certifying body, and in fact, was
never otherwise charged, nor were any other actions taken against him
regarding the allegations of sexual misconduct. 88
The jury awarded Doe compensatory and punitive damages on FERPA
claim.89 The Supreme Court held that FERPA does not support a private
cause of action. 90 Specifically, the Court authorized the Secretary of Ed-
ucation to "deal with violations" of FERPA.91 Because the Act confers
responsibility to handle violations to the Secretary of Education, there
was no clear and unambiguous conferring of a private cause of action
against the school district.92 Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed





Traditionally, employment cases against public school districts have fo-
cused on issues of race and gender discrimination. The following cases
are no different and represent a summary of these issues with the courts'
analysis regarding school district liability. In Goins v. Hitchcock I.S.D., a
women's basketball and volleyball coach brought an action against the
Hitchcock ISD (HISD) and its school board members (individual defend-
ants) alleging race and gender discrimination under § 1981, and § 1983,
Title VII, Title IX, and the Texas state tort law.94 Specifically, the coach
83. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 122 S. Ct. 2268 (2002).






90. Id. at 2279.
91. Id. at 2278.
92. Id. at 2279.
93. Id.
94. Goins v. Hitchcock Indep. Sch. Dist., 191 F. Supp. 2d 860 (S.D. Tex. 2002), affd,
No. 02-41209 (5th Cir. Mar. 27, 2003) (Table).
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claimed that the HISD misrepresented the fact that she would be com-
pensated at a rate equal to the rate paid to her male co-workers and sub-
sequently refused to offer her the amount promised. The coach also
claimed the district attempted to "black ball" her for her refusal to accept
the lower compensation, resulting in her resignation from the HISD.
The court analyzed the coach's claims, finding that the individual de-
fendants were immune from liability in their official capacity. Addition-
ally, the court held that the individual defendants were immune from the
coach's Title IX, Title VII, § 1981, and § 1983 claims in their individual
capacity. 95 Finally, the coach's intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims against the individual defendants were dismissed based on the fact
that the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and the Title
VII claim arose from identical factual allegations and, therefore, the Title
VII claim preempted the claim for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress. 96 Therefore, this case is relevant for the court's holdings that: (1)
no private right of action exists for Title IX claims against school board
members in their individual capacities; (2) individual school board mem-
bers could not be individually liable for Title VII claims; and (3) a claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress is preempted by a Title VII
claim based upon the same factual allegations. 97
In Chavera v. Victoria Independent School District,98 a former school
employee brought a Title VII action against the school district, alleging
that she was subjected to repeated sexual harassment and retaliation by a
fellow employee and later supervisor. Chavera claimed she was construc-
tively discharged from her position with the district because of the intol-
erable work environment created by her supervisor's conduct.99 In
response, the district filed a motion for summary judgment on the con-
structive discharge claim.100
The Fifth Circuit listed five factors to consider when addressing con-
structive discharge claims to determine whether a reasonable employee
would have felt compelled to resign: (1) whether the employee was de-
moted, (2) whether the employee received a reduction in salary, (3)
whether the employee had a reduction in job responsibilities, (4) whether
the employee was reassigned to menial or degrading work (5) whether
the employee was subjected to badgering, harassment, or humiliation by
the employer calculated to encourage the employee's resignation, or (6)
whether the employee was offered early retirement that would make the
employee worse off whether the offer was accepted or not.10' The fifth
factor was the most relevant to the court's assessment of Chavera's
95. Id. at 869-71.
96. Id. at 871-72.
97. Id. at 869, 870.
98. Chavera v, Victoria Indep. Sch. Dist., 221 F. Supp. 2d 741 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
99. Id. at 747.
100. Id. at 742.
101. Id. at 748.
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circumstances.10 2
In support of her case, Chavera produced affidavits, letters, and deposi-
tion testimony, evidencing the alleged harassment. 10 3 The evidence re-
garding the alleged harassment would be sufficient to support a jury
finding that a reasonable employee in Chavera's circumstances would
have felt compelled to resign. Accordingly, the district court denied the
district's motion for summary judgment on the retaliation claim.10 4
In Clark v. La Marque Independent School District,10 5 Trev Clark, a
former history teacher and coach at La Marque Independent School Dis-
trict (LMISD) was indicted on criminal charges stemming from an allega-
tion that he had a sexual relationship with a student. Clark was
subsequently fired from the school district.10 6 The coach accused the dis-
trict of racial discrimination, deprivation of rights, conspiracy, and mali-
cious prosecution.10 7 The court denied the claim of racial discrimination,
finding no racially-motivated conduct by the district.108 Similarly, the
court denied the conspiracy claim, finding that a school district and its
employees are a single entity, and are therefore incapable of conspiring
with themselves.' 0 9 The court also denied the claim regarding the coach's
constitutional rights, holding that the coach failed to show an official pol-
icy or custom that led to a deprivation of constitutional rights.110 Finally,
the court denied the claim of malicious prosecution based upon the
school district's common law and statutory immunity from liability."'
In Perez v. Region 20 Education Service Center,12 Daniel M. Perez was
employed with Region 20 as a Data Processing Specialist. Perez wished
to become a Database administrator for the Regional Service Center
Computer Cooperative (RSCCC) group and submitted a request to Re-
gion 20 asking to be promoted to, or reclassified as, a Database Adminis-
trator.1' 3 Perez's request was denied because there was no Database
Administrator position available in the RSCCC group. 114 He was told
that if the position was ever created, he would get the job." 5 While em-
ployed with Region 20, Perez was treated for stomach problems and
work-related stress, he filed several complaints with the EEOC, and he
received several unfavorable reviews. Perez was discharged from Region
102. Id. at 748.
103. Id. at 751.
104. Id.
105. Clark v. La Marque Indep. Sch. Dist., 184 F. Supp. 2d 606 (S.D. Tex. 2002), affd,
No. 02-40217, 2002 WL 31718006 (5th Cir. Nov. 4, 2002) (Table).
106. Id. at 609.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 610.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 611.
111. Id. at 615.
112. Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Serv. Ctr., 307 F.3d 318 (5th Cir. 2002).





20 on July 1, 1999.116
Subsequently, Perez filed suit in Texas state court, alleging that: (1)
Region 20 discriminated against him based on his Hispanic national ori-
gin, in violation of Title VII when it failed to grant his request regarding
the Database Administrator position; (2) Region 20 discharged him in
retaliation for filing a discrimination claim with the EEOC in violation of
Title VII; (3) Region 20 discharged him because of his Hispanic national
origin in violation of Title VII; (4) Region 20 discriminated against him
due to his mental illness disability in violation of the ADA; and (5) Re-
gion 20 discharged him in retaliation for reporting the sexual harassment
of another Region 20 employee in violation of the Texas Whistleblower
Act.117 The district court granted summary judgment for Region 20 on
all claims and Perez appealed." 8
The district court found that Region 20 articulated a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for its failure to promote Perez.119 Perez was una-
ble to demonstrate that Region 20's proffered reason was simply a pre-
text for discrimination, and thus did not violate Title VII.12o
On his second claim, the district court found that Perez provided suffi-
cient evidence of a causal connection between the filing of his EEOC
complaints and his termination. 21 The court recognized that timing can
constitute evidence of a causal connection between a protected activity
and termination and looked to see whether Region 20 articulated a legiti-
mate, non-discriminatory reason for the termination. 122 The court found
that the reason proffered by Region 20, including Perez's poor work per-
formance, was adequate to shift the burden back to Perez to disprove the
proffered reason.1 23 Perez was unable to disprove the reason stated by
Region 20 for his termination. In particular, Perez was unable to prove
that his termination was due to anything other than his poor work per-
formance.12 4 Thus, Perez was unable to sustain a claim that he was fired
because he filed complaints with the EEOC or because of his Hispanic
national origin.' 25
Perez was also unable to sustain an ADA claim or a Texas
Whistleblower Act Claim because the State of Texas did not consent to
suit in federal court, and, therefore, Region 20 was protected by Eleventh
Amendment immunity. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of
the district court dismissing each of Perez's five claims.126
116. Id. at 323.
117. Id. at 318.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 324.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 325.
122. Id. at 318.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 326.




Defamation cases frequently occur in the public school context due to
the unique nature of the issues, including personnel issues, faced by a
district board of trustees. In Brashear v. Rojas, a superintendent who was
terminated from the Dallas Independent School District (DISD) brought
a slander action against the members of the DISD school board in their
individual capacities. 127 Specifically, the superintendent alleged that
board members used the media to attack him, falsely accused him of vio-
lating both board policy and State law, and distributed a packet of defam-
atory material about him.128 The board members filed a motion for
summary judgment on the grounds of official immunity, and the district
court denied the motion.129 On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the
district court's decision.1 30
The court, as in previous decisions, outlined the standard for determin-
ing whether a governmental employee is entitled to official immunity: (1)
for the performance of discretionary duties; (2) within the scope of the
employee's authority; and (3) for acts performed in good faith.131 The
court examined the requirement that the employee establish that he/she
acted in good faith.' 32 The evidence presented by the defendants regard-
ing the good faith requirement were affidavits that did not address all of
the employee's complaints. 133 "The affidavit of a defendant may be suffi-
cient to establish good faith if the affidavit is clear, positive, direct, other-
wise credible, free from contradiction, and readily controvertible.' 34
The court determined, therefore, that the affidavits did not meet the bur-
den to establish that the defendants acted in good faith.
In Griffin v. Nelson, 35 an employee with a continuing contract claimed
that he had a property interest in maintaining a level of local supplement
components to his compensation, in addition to receiving the increased
state base salary. The district reduced the employee's supplemental sti-
pend and his local increment from the previous year; but, because the
state base pay had increased, the employee's total salary was more than
the previous year.' 36 The court found that a district that historically of-
fers supplements is not bound to continue offering supplements and that
a property interest is not created in future supplements. 37 The court de-
127. Brashear v. Rojas, No. 05-01-01187-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas Feb. 20, 2002, no pet.)
(not designated for publication), 2002 WL 253939.
128. Id. at *1.
129. Id.
130. Id. at *3.
131. Id. at *1.
132. Id.
133. Id. at *2.
134. Id. at *1 (quoting Smith v. Davis, 999 S.W.2d 409, 415 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, no
pet.)).
135. Griffin v. Nelson, No. 03-01-00323-CV (Tex. App.-Austin Feb. 14, 2002, no pet.)
(not designated for publication), 2002 WL 220316.
136. Id. at *1.
137. Id. at *2.
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termined that the state increase in the employee's base salary more than
offset the district's reductions to the employee's local supplements. 38 Ac-
cordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court.
As in the court's opinion in Brashear v. Rojas outlined above, in Llanes
v. Corpus Christi Independent School District, a school employee brought
an action against the Corpus Christi Independent School District
(CCISD) alleging wrongful termination in violation of the Texas
Whistleblower Act and breach of contract.139 The employee was a secre-
tary for the associate superintendent and she applied for another position
in the CCISD, but was not chosen for the position.140 The employee then
proceeded to complain about the hiring process; however, her supervisor
and the superintendent told the employee they believed the CCISD was
in compliance with their policies.' 4' When the employee was then termi-
nated less than two months later, she brought this action. 42
The district court severed the Whistleblower claim and granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the CCISD. 143 The court of appeals upheld
the district court's decision finding that the employee failed to state a
Whistleblower claim. 144
The focus of the court's decision was the interpretation of the first ele-
ment of a Whistleblower claim that requires the employee to provide evi-
dence that she reported an alleged violation of law to an appropriate
authority. 145 In this case, the employee only alleged that "the hiring pro-
cess violated board policy and the law."'1 46 The court determined that
although "an employee need not identify a specific law when making a
report, and need not establish an actual violation of law, there must be
some law prohibiting the complained of conduct to give rise to a
Whistleblower claim .... Thus, to recover under the Act, an employee
must have a good-faith belief that a law, which in fact exists, was vio-
lated.' 47 On this basis, the court affirmed the lower court's decision be-
cause there was no evidence that the employee reported an alleged
violation of law.
In Peters v. Nelson,148 a former elementary classroom teacher was ter-
minated because she was not in compliance with the terms of her con-
tract. The Commissioner of Education affirmed her termination, and the
trial court upheld the Commissioner of Education's decision. The teacher
138. Id.
139. Llanes v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 64 S.W.3d 638 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 2002, pet denied).




144. Id. at 643.
145. Id. at 641.
146. Id. at 642.
147. Id. at 642-43.
148. Peters v. Nelson, No. 05-01-01304-CV, 2002 WL 531485 (Tex. App-Dallas April
10, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication), 2002 WL 531485.
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appealed. 149 The teacher asserted that the Commissioner's decision was
in error for three reasons: (1) the district failed to file a local record as
required by law; (2) the district was aware that she was not certified when
she was hired; and (3) the district did not provide her with notice as re-
quired by § 21.253 of the Education Code. 150 Her arguments in (1) and
(2) were defeated by her own admission that she lacked certification.151
Additionally, she acknowledged that she was aware that her contract was
conditioned upon obtaining certification. 152 Finally, the court found that
the notice she referred to in her last argument is required for due process
purposes and that, without a valid contract, she had no property interest
in her continued employment. The court of appeals properly upheld the
trial court's judgment affirming her termination.' 53
C. CONTRACTS
In La Villa Independent School District v. Gomez Garza Design,
Inc., ' 54 Gomez Garza Design, Inc. (Garza) brought a breach of contract
claim against La Villa Independent School District (LVISD). Following a
jury finding in favor of Garza, LVISD brought an appeal. 155 Specifically,
the LVISD asserted that a valid contract did not exist between LVISD
and Garza for two reasons: (1) the LVISD claimed no authenticated min-
utes of a school board meeting existed to indicate the school board's au-
thorization of the contract; and (2) the LVISD's superintendent did not
have the authority to bind the LVISD by signing the contract.
The court of appeals engaged in a two step analysis to determine
whether a contract existed between LVISD and Garza.156 First, the court
found that the district did have authenticated minutes of a school board
meeting that indicated the Board authorized a contract directing Garza to
design a new elementary school. 157 Second, the court determined the
Board had the power to authorize, approve, and sign the contract at is-
sue.158 Additionally, the court found the superintendent was acting with
the Board's knowledge, and implicit approval, when he signed the con-
tract on behalf of the Board. For these reasons, the court of appeals de-
termined a valid contract existed and upheld the jury's finding in favor of
Garza. 159
149. Id. at *1.
150. Id. at *24.
151. Id. at *2.
152. Id. at *3.
153. Id. at *4.
154. La Villa Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gomez Garza Design, Inc, 79 S.W.3d 217 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied).
155. Id. at 219.
156. Id. at 219-20.
157. Id. at 220-21.
158. Id. at 221.




In Goodie v. Houston,160 the Houston Independent School District
(HISD) Board of Educators disregarded the Commissioner of Educa-
tion's decision that a terminated teacher should be reinstated. After the
board terminated the teacher's contract, the teacher appealed, and the
Commissioner ordered that she be reinstated. 161 The board then ap-
pealed to the district court, which upheld the board's termination of the
teacher and stated that the Commissioner may not reverse the board's
decision. 162 The teacher and the Commissioner both appealed. 163 The
court of appeals granted the teacher's and Commissioner's appeal.
This decision focused on the application of section 21.259(d) of the
Texas Education Code, which requires that a board must comply with the
requirement that a recommendation of a hearing examiner should not be
changed without stating a reason and legal basis for the change. Specifi-
cally, the Legislature enacted section 21.259(d) of the Texas Education
Code to prevent school boards from making arbitrary, capricious, and
unlawful decisions that may conflict with a decision made by the Commis-
sioner of Education. 164 The HISD board failed to comply with this stat-
ute. 165 The board contended that even if it did not meet the requirements
of section 21.259(d), this failure was merely a procedural error that did
not justify a reversal of the board's decision by the Commissioner.166 The
court of appeals noted the Texas Supreme Court's acknowledgement that
the requirement to state in writing the reason and legal basis for any
change or rejection of the examiner's findings, conclusions, or recommen-
dations is designed to protect "the independent nature of the hearing ex-
aminer process."'1 67 Therefore, the board's failure to comply with section
21.259(d) resulted in the court's reaching the decision to uphold the Com-
missioner's decision to reinstate the teacher. 68
In Port Arthur Independent School District v. Klein & Associates Politi-
cal Relations,169 a website published an article about a fight at Thomas
Jefferson High School within the Port Arthur Independent School Dis-
trict (PAISD). PAISD sued the author and the sponsor of the website for
defamation. 170 The court found that PAISD, as a government entity of
the state, could not sue for defamation. 171
160. Goodie v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 57 S.W.3d 646 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2001, pet denied).
161. Id. at 650.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 649, 650.
164. Id. at 649, 651.
165. Id. at 651.
166. Id.
167. Id. (citing Montgomery Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Davis, 34 S.W.3d 559, 564. (Tex. 2000)).
168. Id.
169. Port Arthur Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Klein & Assocs. Political Relations, 70 S.W.3d 349,
351 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2002, no pet.).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 352.
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In Vela v. Waco Independent School District,172 an elementary school
principal, who had been demoted to work in the district's central office,
brought claims against the Waco Independent School District (WISD),
claiming sex discrimination and racial discrimination. The Superinten-
dent told Vela that the demotion was due to "widespread unhappiness"
among her employees and that "many" of her employees feared her.173
Vela filed a suit against WISD in state district court and, in response,
WISD filed a plea to the jurisdiction claiming that Vela had not ex-
hausted her administrative remedies with the Commissioner of Education
before filing the suit.' 74 Vela had filed a claim of discrimination with the
Texas Commission on Human Rights (TCHRA), but she did not file an
appeal of her demotion with the Texas Education Agency (TEA). 175 The
court reversed the trail court's order of dismissal, holding that Vela's ap-
peal to the TCHRA was sufficient and that she did not need to exhaust
both the TCHRA process and the TEA appeal process. 176
E. IMMUNITY
1. Governmental Employee Immunity under 42 U.S. C. § 1985(2)
claims, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 First Amendment Claims, and 42
U.S.C. § 1983 Due Process Claim
In July of 2002, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Kinney v. Weaver,
was asked to consider whether law enforcement officers employed by the
State of Texas were entitled to qualified immunity in various circum-
stances. 177 Specifically, the court addressed the issue of qualified immu-
nity in the context of violations of the right to testify freely under 42
U.S.C. § 1985(2), the right to free speech under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, the right to due process of law under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the right to "official immunity" against a state law
claim. 178
Dean Kinney and David Hall were instructors at the East Texas Police
Academy (ETPA), a division of Kilgore College in Kilgore, Texas, where
they provided basic and advanced training for law enforcement of-
ficers.179 In August of 1998, Kinney and Hall (the instructors) testified as
expert witnesses in a murder trial stating that, in their opinion, Kerrville
police officers had used excessive force and had failed to implement
proper policies necessary to direct the conduct of "snipers."'180 As a re-
sult of this testimony, the instructors suffered adverse employment action
172. Vela v. Waco Indep. Sch. Dist., 69 S.W.3d 695 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, pet.
withdrawn).
173. Id. at 697.
174. Id. at 698.
175. Id. at 697-98.
176. Id. at 702.
177. Kinney v. Weaver, 301 F.3d 253 (5th Cir. 2002).
178. Id. at 256.




against them, including losing their jobs and being forced to accept lower
paying jobs. They alleged that a large group of police chiefs and sheriffs
(supervisors) were angered by their testimony and retaliated by canceling
current enrollment in their classes and refusing to allow future
enrollment.181
a. The Instructors' § 1985(2) Claim
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of qualified
immunity for the supervisors on the § 1985(2) claim. The supervisors ar-
gued that the instructors' § 1985(2) claim should fail for two reasons. 182
First, the supervisors argued that a § 1985(2) claim can be sustained only
when the claimant can prove that it was motivated by or based on racial
animus. 83 Second, the supervisors argued that § 1985(2) only applied to
fact witnesses and not expert witnesses. 184 The district court held that a
racial animus is not necessary to establish a § 1985(2) claim. Furthermore,
the district court viewed the supervisors' attempts to restrict the applica-
tion of § 1985(2) to fact witnesses was unreasonable.1 85
b. The Instructors' § 1983 Claims Invoking Their Rights to Freedom
of Speech
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's denial of qualified
immunity for the supervisors on the § 1983 claims. Relying on the balanc-
ing inquiry set forth in Pickering v. Board of Education, the court found
that the instructors' testimony was speech of public concern outweighing
any governmental interest in this case. 186 Furthermore, the court of ap-
peals confirmed that the instructors had suffered adverse action as a re-
sult of the supervisors' boycott of their courses.
The final part of the analysis applied by the court was the question
whether the supervisors' actions violated a "clearly established" right of
the instructors. 187 Specifically, the relevant question was whether it
would have been apparent to a reasonably competent officer that the al-
leged conduct against the instructors violated the First Amendment? 188
The supervisors argued that no controlling case existed directly address-
ing a First Amendment claim where a plaintiff had provided services to
the governmental defendant but was neither an employee of the defen-
dant nor in a contractual relationship with the defendant.' 89 The supervi-
sors characterize the instructors as "employees of a disappointed bidder,
i.e., Kilgore College," and claimed that it was not clearly established that
181. Id. at 259.
182. Id. at 264.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 262.
185. Id. at 264.
186. Id. at 276-77 (relying on Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
187. Id. at 278.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 279.
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the First Amendment imposed any restrictions on their conduct with the
instructors in their capacity as training instructors. 190
The court of appeals disagreed, stating that the supervisors would have
known they had the power to deny the instructors significant financial
benefits as ETPA instructors and that it is the existence of that sort of
power, and not mere labels describing governmental relationships, that is
determinative in First Amendment "denial of benefit" cases.191 The
court emphasized that recognizing the distinction between governmental
employees and regular service providers would invite manipulation by
governmental entities in order to avoid constitutional liability simply by
attaching different labels to particular jobs.' 92 The court, therefore, up-
held the instructors' § 1983 claims.
c. The Instructors' State Tort Claims Prohibiting Tortious
Interference with Business
The court of appeals also affirmed the district court's denial of quali-
fied immunity for the supervisors on the state tort claims. Texas law pro-
vides government officials with "official immunity from suit arising from
the performance of their discretionary duties in good faith as long as they
are acting within the scope of their authority."'1 93 It is undisputed that the
supervisors had the authority to decide where, and by whom, their re-
spective agencies' officers were trained, and that such decisions were
among the supervisors' discretionary duties.' 94 The issue was whether
they acted in good faith in refusing to enroll their officers in the instruc-
tors' courses.' 95 To prove they were acting in good faith, the supervisors
were required to show that a reasonable officer could have believed that
denouncing Kinney and Hall in various communications and boycotting
their courses was justified because of their expert testimony containing
opinions against law enforcement.' 96 The court of appeals found that the
supervisors were unable to make such a showing and, therefore, affirmed
the district court's denial of qualified immunity.197
d. The Instructor's § 1983 Claims Invoking their Fourteenth
Amendment Right to Due Process of Law
The court held that the supervisors did have qualified immunity from
the instructors' § 1983 due process claims. 198 Specifically, the court held
that the instructors failed to demonstrate any deprivation of a property or
190. Id.
191. Id. at 280-81.
192. Id. (citing O'Hare Truck Servs., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 722
(1996)).








liberty interest grounded in state law.' 99 Consistent with this opinion, the
case was affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part to the dis-
trict court for entry of judgment in favor of the supervisors on the instruc-
tors' § 1983 due process claims and for trial on the remaining claims.
2. Governmental Employee Immunity under Texas Tort Claims Act
In Lowry v. Pearce,200 Joy Pearce brought a wrongful death action
against the state school, its superintendent, various school employees,
and the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation
(MHMR). Pearce alleged that her son, Robert, died from the ingestion
of medication prescribed for a school employee, Sheldon Harris.20' Rob-
ert allegedly removed the medication from the pocket of Harris's coat
after Harris left it on a hook on Robert's bedroom door.202 Pearce as-
serted that Harris was negligent in leaving the pills where Robert could
access them.203 She further asserted that employees William Lowry and
Evelyn Thomas were negligent in their supervision of Harris by allowing
him to have his prescription drugs around the patients. 20 4 The petition
also alleged that the school and MHMR were liable for the conduct of
Lowry and Thomas.20 5
The trial court granted Lowry and Thomas's motion for summary judg-
ment on Pearce's claims brought pursuant to the Texas Tort Claims Act
but denied their motion as it related to the Patient's Bill of Rights.20 6
The court of appeals reversed the portion of the trial court's judgment
denying the motion for summary judgment with respect to Pearce's
claims under the Patient's Bill of Rights and rendered judgment in favor
of Lowry and Thomas.20 7
The court of appeals determined that the trial court was mistaken in its
reasoning that a cause of action must arise under the Texas Tort Claim
Act to invoke governmental employee immunity under section
101.106.208 Specifically, the court relied on the Texas Supreme Court's
decision in Newman v. Obersteller, in which the court held that the immu-
nity conveyed to a governmental unit's employees by section 101.106 is
triggered by any judgment in a Texas Tort Claim suit against a govern-
mental unit.209 Therefore, in holding that the employees were entitled to
immunity, the court found that "[s]ection 101.106 unequivocally grants
immunity for all employees whose acts or omissions gave rise to the claim
against the governmental unit when the allegations against the employees
199. Id. at 285.
200. Lowry v. Pearce, 72 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, pet. denied).





206. Id. at 754.
207. Id. at 755.
208. Id. at 754-55.
209. Id. (citing Newman v. Obersteller, 960 S.W.2d 621, 622-23 (Tex. 1997)).
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are based on the same occurrence as addressed in the judgment for or
against the governmental unit. '210
In Tarkington Independent School District v. Aiken,21 Aiken brought a
claim against the Tarkington Independent School District (TISD) for per-
sonal injuries sustained while he was riding on the tailgate of a privately
owned pick up truck driven by an employee, Roberts. Aiken sought to
bring his claim within the Texas Tort Claims Act by maintaining his inju-
ries were caused by the "use" or "operation" of a motor vehicle.212 The
Texas Supreme Court has stated that "use" means to "put or bring into
action or service; to employ for or apply to a given purpose," and "opera-
tion" means a "doing or performing of a practical work. '213 The court of
appeals reasoned that employee Roberts did not bring the privately-
owned vehicle into service or action, did not employ it for or apply it to a
given purpose, and did not perform a practical work with it.214 Com-
plaints alleging negligence and/or omissions relating to the improper su-
pervision of non-employees and the improper training of school district
employees do not fall within the "use or operation" of a motor vehicle
exception to the Texas Tort Claims Act.215
Even so, Aiken argued that sovereign immunity was waived because
the employee, Roberts, the only supervisor on site, exercised control and
direction over the program participants' actions and, in that sense, "used"
or "operated" the vehicle. 216 This argument was unsuccessful due to the
limitation on the Act's waiver of immunity provision. 21 7 A school district
is not liable for personal injuries proximately caused by a negligent em-
ployee unless the injury "arises from the operation or use of a motor
driven vehicle or motor driven equipment. '21 8 The trial court relied on a
decision from the Texas Supreme Court which stated, "[w]hile the statute
does not specify whose operation or use is necessary-the employee's,
the person who suffers injury, or some third party-we think the most
plausible reading of the immunity provision is that the required operation
or use is that of the employee. '219 The court of appeals reversed the trial
court's decision, holding that, because there was no nexus between
Aiken's injuries and an employee's negligent operation or use of the vehi-
cle, the complaint did not fall within the scope of the waiver of immunity
under the Tort Claims Act.220
210. Id. at 755.
211. Tarkington Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aiken, 67 S.W.3d 319 (Tex. App-Beaurnont 2002,
no pet.).
212. Id. at 323.
213. Id. (citing LeLeaux v. Hamshire-Fannett Indep. Sch. Dist., 835 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Tex.
1992)).
214. Id. at 324.
215. Id. at 323-324.
216. Id. at 325-26.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 324 (citing LeLeaux, 835 S.W.2d at 51).
219. Id. (quoting LeLeaux, 835 S.W.2d at 51).




1. Texas Tort Claims Act
In Axtell v. University of Texas at Austin,22 1 a former University of
Texas basketball player, Luke Axtell, brought claims against the univer-
sity, the athletic director, and the head basketball coach for alleged negli-
gence and violations of FERPA. Axtell's grades were allegedly faxed by
a UT employee to a local radio station, which then broadcast the grades
to the public. 222 Axtell conceded that he could not maintain a cause of
action under FERPA.2 23 However, Axtell maintained that the university
used tangible personal property to send his confidential education
records and that this use of the fax machine caused his injuries. 224 There-
fore, according to Axtell, the university waived its immunity from suit.2 25
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that
the tangible personal property exception to governmental immunity
under the Texas Tort Claims Act did not properly apply to alleged tort
liability resulting from the disclosure of confidential information. 226 Spe-
cifically, the court found that it was the disclosure of the information, not
the use of the fax machine, that caused the alleged injury; therefore, the
student's appeal was denied.227
2. Official Immunity
As with prior years, decisions regarding official immunity, shielding a
governmental employee from individual liability, are always of great in-
terest to public school district administrators. In Kudesia v. Morgan, the
El Paso Texas Court of Appeals examined the "good faith" element of an
individual's claim of official immunity.228 In Kudesia, a physician in the
residency program at Texas Tech University Health Science Center in
Odessa, Texas, claimed that the director of the program intentionally, ma-
liciously, and willfully interfered with his program agreement by prevent-
ing his promotion to the second-year of residency without cause or
justification. The physician had been placed on performance contracts to
address his poor ratings and evaluations. The decision not to promote
him to a second-year residency was made by the faculty based upon their
determination that his "continued course as a resident would place pa-
tients at risk."'229
In examining the physician's claims, the court reiterated the appropri-
ate standard for summary judgments based upon the affirmative defenses
221. Axtell v. Univ. of Tex., 69 S.W.3d 261 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.).
222. Id. at 263.
223. Id. at 264.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 264-67.
227. Id. at 267.
228. Kudesia v. Morgan, No. 08-01-00113-CV (Tex. App.-El Paso Jan. 18, 2002, pet.
denied) (not designated for publication), 2002 WL 64542.
229. Id. at *1.
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of official immunity and sovereign immunity.230 Specifically, the court
identified that a motion for summary judgment based upon these affirma-
tive defenses should be granted only if the defendants establish all of the
elements of the applicable affirmative defenses as a matter of law.231
Therefore, to establish the elements of the affirmative defense of official
immunity, the director of the program was "required to establish by com-
petent summary judgment evidence that the acts complained-of were: (1)
discretionary; (2) performed in good faith; and (3) within the scope of his
official duties. ' 232 To establish the "good faith" element, the director was
required to establish "that a reasonably prudent person could have be-
lieved that his or her actions were justified under the circumstances. '233
Because the evidence presented by the director that the decision regard-
ing the physician's lack of promotion was based on the faculty's concerns
about his clinical abilities including his clinical judgment and decision-
making skills, the court found a reasonably prudent person could have
believed that the director's actions were justified under the circum-
stances.234 Therefore, summary judgment for the director on the basis of
official immunity was affirmed.235
Mold cases abound throughout the State and concern most building
owners, including public school districts. However, mold cases against
school districts have not been entirely successful. In Foster v. Denton In-
dependent School District, an elementary school teacher brought an ac-
tion against the Denton ISD (DISD) for intentional nuisance and
pollution and alleged violations of statutes relating to the provision of
safe work environments, hazardous conditions.236 The teacher allegedly
became ill from mold and fungal spores in her classroom that were spread
by the school's heating and cooling system. 237 The court denied the
teacher's claims against the DISD finding: (1) her nuisance claim did not
fall within the exception to sovereign immunity for takings-related nui-
sance claims; (2) her claims for intentional pollution were barred by sov-
ereign immunity; (3) the DISD was protected from her claim that the
district violated the statute regarding their duty to provide a safe work-
place by sovereign immunity; and (4) she did not plead a cognizable cause
of action against the DISD under the Hazard Communication Act.238
This decision assuaged many districts' concerns regarding potential liabil-
ity in mold cases. However, this case has not deterred potential plaintiffs
in these actions.




234. Id. at *3.
235. Id.
236. Foster v. Denton Indep. Sch. Dist., 73 S.W.3d 454 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002,
no pet.).
237. Id. at 457.




1. School Voucher Programs
In 1995, a federal district court declared a "crisis of magnitude" and
placed the entire Cleveland school district under state control.2 39 In
1996, in response to the education crisis in Cleveland, the State of Ohio
established the Pilot Program Scholarship Program.240 The program pro-
vided educational choices in the form of tuition vouchers to parents and
students in the Cleveland school district.2 41 Parents could use the tuition
voucher to send their child to any religious private school, nonreligious
private school, or public school of their choice within the district.2 42 In
1996, a group of Ohio tax payers, challenged the program claiming that it
violated the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. On
June 27, 2002, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals decision, holding that the program did not offend the Establish-
ment Clause.243
The taxpayers claimed that the program had the "primary effect" of
advancing religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.244 The Su-
preme Court viewed the Ohio program as being entirely neutral with re-
spect to religion.2 45 The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
prevents a state from enacting laws that have the "purpose" or "effect" of
advancing or inhibiting religion.2 46 The Court determined there is no dis-
pute that the Ohio program was enacted for the valid secular purpose of
providing assistance to poor children in a failing public school system. 247
Furthermore, the Court found that, under this program, government aid
reaches religious institutions only by way of the deliberate choices of nu-
merous individual recipients.2 48 "The incidental advancement of a relig-
ious mission, or the perceived endorsement of a religious message, is
reasonably attributable to the individual aid recipients not the govern-
ment, whose role ends with the disbursement of benefits. '2 49 Based on
this finding, the Supreme Court upheld the tuition voucher program.
2. School Prayer
Following the Supreme Court's decision regarding school prayer at
football games, many thought school prayer would be at the forefront of
decisions over the past year. The conflict between church and state will
continue in the foreseeable future. The Fifth Circuit addressed some of




243. Id. at 648, 663.
244. Id. at 648.
245. Id. at 653.
246. Id. at 648.
247. Id. at 653.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 652.
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these issues in Doe v. School Board of Ouachita Parish.250 In Doe, school
children and their parents sought a declaration that a Louisiana statute
providing for verbal prayer in the schools was unconstitutional and an
injunction ending the practice of verbal prayer at the schools. 251
In order to determine whether the statute at issue violated the Estab-
lishment Clause, the Court relied on a three-prong test introduced by the
Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman.252 First, the statute must have a secular
purpose; second, its principal effect must neither advance nor inhibit re-
ligion; and third, it must not foster excessive government entanglement
with religion.253 Failure on any prong of the test results in a finding that a
statute is unconstitutional.254 In this case, the Court found there was no
doubt that the statute was motivated by a wholly religious purpose, which
ran afoul of the Establishment Clause.255 The court of appeals held that
because the statute was not adopted with a secular purpose, it violated
the Establishment Clause and was, therefore, unconstitutional.256
I. STATE CREATED DANGER
Breen v. Texas A&M University,257 involved a lawsuit regarding the
Texas A&M Bonfire tragedy. The plaintiffs in this action alleged that
Texas A&M and various former and present high-level University em-
ployees violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when they deprived the Bonfire victims
of their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by acting with delib-
erate indifference to the state created danger that killed or injured
them.258
The court recognized that the Constitution imposes a duty on the state
to protect particular individuals only in "certain" limited circum-
stances. 259 The Fifth Circuit has recognized two such limited scenarios:
(1) when the state has a special relationship with a person; or (2) when
the state exposes a person to a danger of its own creation, or a "state
created danger. ' 260 The two basic requirements of the state created dan-
ger theory are: (1) state actors created or increased the danger to the
plaintiff; and (2) state actors acted with deliberate indifference. 261 Even
if the court were to agree that the defendants created an environment
that was dangerous to the Bonfire victims, it is quite clear that they did
not do so with "deliberate indifference. '262 The Supreme Court has
250. Doe v. Sch. Bd. of Ouachita Parish, 274 F.3d 289 (5th Cir. 2001).
251. Id. at 289.
252. Id. at 293 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id at 294-95.
256. Id. at 295.
257. Breen v. Tex. A&M Univ., 213 F. Supp. 2d 766 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
258. Id. at 768.
259. Id. at 774.
260. Id.




made it clear that "deliberate indifference" is defined as reckless or
grossly negligent conduct.2 63 The plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the
defendants' actions rose to a level of recklessness or gross negligence.
Therefore, the court granted the university's motion for summary judg-
ment with respect to the plaintiffs' federal law claims.
2 64
McKinney v. Irving Independent School District 65 also discussed the
issue of state-created danger. David McKinney, an employee who served
as a teacher and bus driver, reported that students on his bus had multi-
ple serious behavior problems.2 66 He requested a monitor to supervise
the students, but the Irving Independent School District (IISD) denied
his request.2 67 A student then attacked him while he was driving by
spraying a fire extinguisher in his eyes.2 68 McKinney sued IISD for his
injuries alleging common law negligence, negligence under the Texas Tort
Claims Act, and violations of his Fourteenth Amendment due process
rights.269 In particular, he alleged the IISD "created a dangerous envi-
ronment" by placing the special education students with known behavior
problems on one bus and refusing to equip the bus with a monitor.
270
The Fifth Circuit has not adopted the state-created danger theory of
recovery under § 1983.271 The court expressed doubt that the plaintiff
would prevail on such a claim even if they did recognize the theory.
2 72
The court assumed that in order for the plaintiff to recover under this
theory he would have to show, at a minimum that: (1) the state actors
created or increased the danger to the plaintiff; and (2) the state actors
acted with deliberate indifference.2 73
Although the pleadings described a dangerous environment, the court
found there were no allegations of fact showing that the defendant's con-
duct increased the danger.2 74 It was the student's conduct that made Mc-
Kinney's working environment dangerous and the court reasoned that,
while the defendant may have failed to limit or reduce the danger, that
was not the same as having increased it.275 Additionally, the complaint
did not allege facts sufficient to establish that the defendant was deliber-
ately indifferent because the student's attack on McKinney could have
happened regardless of whether a monitor was placed on the bus.
276
Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's judgment dis-
263. Id. at 775.
264. Id. at 777.
265. McKinney v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 309 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 2002).
266. Id. at 310-12.
267. Id. at 310-11.
268. Id. at 311.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 313.
272. Id. at 313-14.
273. Id. at 313 (citing Piotrowski, 51 F.3d at 512, 515).





missing each of the McKinney's claims.277
J. SPECIAL EDUCATION
In Samuel Tyler W. v. Northwest Independent School District,278 a spe-
cial education student's parents filed a request for a due process hearing
to determine whether the Northwest Independent School District (NISD)
provided the student with a free appropriate public education (FAPE).
The student suffered from autism and Pervasive Developmental Disorder
(PDD).279 In this case, the court detailed three years of history of admis-
sion review dismissal (ARD) committee meetings, treatment, testing, and
complaints by the parents regarding the education of their mentally hand-
icapped son.280
The parents argued that "any fool would know that there is only one
method proven to be effective in treating children with autism." The par-
ents claimed that because the district refused to devote itself exclusively
to following that methodology, it had failed to provide the student with a
FAPE. None of the cases cited by the parents supported the proposition
that parents alone can decide whether the FAPE requirement is met. The
law does not require that a school district provide a student with a "Cadil-
lac education." Rather, the Court held that the Individuals with Disabili-
ties Education Act (IDEA) simply mandates a "basic floor of
opportunity" to receive an education benefit. The school district had not
failed to meet this standard simply because it used a variety of
methodologies. 281
In Adam v. Keller,282 the parents of a child diagnosed with Asperger's
Disorder disagreed with an individual education program (IEP) proposed
by the ARD committee for the 2001-2002 school year and brought an
administrative claim against the school district. The parents claimed that
the district failed to provide FAPE, as required by the IDEA.283 The
plaintiff was unable to prove that he received little or no educational ben-
efit from his IEP.284 Plaintiff's teachers and others who worked with him
testified as to the progress he made while enrolled in the district. Plaintiff
took the same courses as other students, only they were tailored to meet
his special needs. He earned credits toward graduation and it was antici-
pated that he would continue to do so. There was also testimony that
plaintiff stated he chose not to do well in school so that he would cause
trouble at home, and stated that he would rather be arrested then sent
277. Id. at 315.
278. Samuel Tyler W. v. N.W. Indep. Sch. Dist., 202 F. Supp. 2d 557 (N.D. Tex. 2002).
279. Id. at 560.
280. Id. at 560-561.
281. Id. at 563.
282. Adam J. v. Keller Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 4:01-CV-0797-A (N. D. Tex. Aug. 15,
2002) (unpublished opinion), 2002 WL 1906001, affd, No. 02-11032, 2003 WL 1894693 (5th
Cir. May 2, 2003).
283. Id. at *3.
284. Id. at *4.
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home. As IDEA recognizes, the school district must provide the oppor-
tunity for educational benefits; it cannot guarantee results.285
Both courts upheld the hearing officer's decision holding: (1) that the
defendant complied with the procedures set forth in IDEA; (2) that the
IEPs developed through the Act's procedures were reasonably calculated
to enable plaintiff to receive educational benefits; and (3) that the plain-
tiff was not entitled to be reimbursed for the alternative placement. 286
K. SCHOOL FINANCE
The state legislature is currently debating the issues of Texas public
school finance. In an effort to reach a resolution through judicial inter-
vention, several school districts filed suit against the Commissioner of Ed-
ucation, the Texas Education Agency, the Comptroller of Public
Accounts, the State Board of Education, and several other school dis-
tricts.287 The districts brought a declaratory judgment against the defend-
ants seeking a declaration that the school finance system in Texas had
become a state ad valorem tax and was, therefore, unconstitutional.288
The district court dismissed the case on special exceptions and granted
the State's plea to the jurisdiction.289 The court of appeals affirmed the
decision finding the districts failed to state a cause of action by not refer-
ring to their ability to meet their obligation to provide an accredited edu-
cation.290 Further, the court determined the case was not ripe for
review.291
The districts argued they were forced to tax at or near the $1.50 tax cap
to educate their students and that they would be required to continue to
take cost-saving measures to remain under the cap.292 Specifically, the
court found "the allegation that a district is forced to tax at the highest
allowable rate to provide the bare, accredited education is a necessary
element of a cause of action brought by a district challenging the cap. '293
Finally, the court found the case was unripe because the districts chal-
lenging the system failed to plead that they had no further discretion in
setting the rate of tax to meet their education obligations.294
L. No CHILD LEFT BEHIND
On Jan. 8, 2002, President Bush signed into law the No Child Left Be-
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Alanis, 78 S.W.3d 529 (Tex. App.-
Austin 2002, pet. granted).
288. Id. at 531.
289. Id. at 538.
290. Id. at 543.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 542.
293. Id. at 539.
294. Id. at 542.
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hind Act of 2001 (NCLB). 295 NCLB contains President Bush's reform
plan for education, including extensive changes to the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act (ESEA). Public schools across the nation are
now accountable to the federal government because they are required by
the NCLB to report individual school and district success based on stu-
dent achievement. The NCLB outlines "four basic education reform
principles: stronger accountability for results, increased flexibility and lo-
cal control, expanded options for parents, and an emphasis on teaching
methods that have been proven to work. '296
Under NCLB, as "accountable" education systems, states must imme-
diately create their own standards for what a child should know and learn
for all grades and develop standards for science by the 2005-06 school
year. 297 Further, once standards are established, states must test every
student's progress toward the standards by using tests aligned with the
standards. 298 The expectations under the NCLB are that each state,
school district, and school will be expected to make adequate yearly pro-
gress (AYP) toward meeting the established state standards. AYP will be
measured for all students by categorizing test results for students into
subcategories including: students who are economically disadvantaged,
students from racial or ethnic minority groups, students who have disabil-
ities, or students who have limited English proficiency.299 District and
state report cards will be published detailing the performance of individ-
ual schools, individual school districts, and statewide performance. 3°° A
school or school district that repeatedly fails to meet its AYP goal will
face corrective action. 30 1
As states and local school districts struggle to interpret, analyze, and
apply NCLB, it is anticipated that many cases and further legislation will
result. NCLB will be an issue to watch over the coming years to deter-
mine its effectiveness, its challenges, and its effect on existing school law
precedent and legislation.
295. No Child Left Behind Act, Publ. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002); see also
United States Dep't of Educ., Introduction: No Child Left Behind, at http://www.nclb.gov/
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